PhD Thesis Presentation and Review: The United Nations and the Question of Palestine: A Study in International Legal Subalternity

By: Dalaal F. Jaber* 

Book Author: Ardi Imseis**

Original language: English;

Publisher: University of Cambridge (Thesis). Link to the thesis: here

Publication year: 2019

Number of pages: 245 pages

With a scholarly transition to address the Zionist occupation of Palestine from a settler-colonial paradigm, it has become imperative now more than ever to reassess the UN’s attitude to the Palestinian cause. Ever since its inception, holding the torch of international peace and security, the UN has been assigned to pave the way forward for a “solution” to the question of Palestine. Nevertheless, a facile observation of the Palestinian political, legal, and economic losses over the past seventy-four years leaves one doubting the parity in the UN’s leadership. For long, there had been a lack of literature that tackles the UN experience in dealing with the Palestinian people from a critical legal theory lens. It is indeed pressing to start incorporating heterodox approaches in examining the UN’s structure, methodology, and response in a manner that better answers to the settler-colonial paradigm, away from the ad nauseam mainstream analysis.

From both academic and pragmatic perspectives, having been a legal scholar on international law and Palestine and having worked within the UN system for many years in the occupied Palestinian territories, Professor Ardi Imseis keenly takes on the mission of scrutinizing the UN’s involvement in key moments throughout the Palestinian struggle from a subaltern stance. In his book, Imseis conscientiously investigates the oscillation between international law requirements and the position of the UN concerning Palestine and concludes the UN’s failure to meet the prevailing legal framework. Imseis questions the UN’s allegiance to the international rule of law where its practice, in reality, seems to be a rule by law. Imseis argues that the actions of the UN throughout the quest for “just and lasting peace” between Israelis and Palestinians have positioned Palestine and its people in a state of International Legal Subalternity (ILS). Imseis demonstrates that the state of International Legal Subalternity is reflected in the promise of justice under a legitimacy umbrella at the time it is being inexorably withheld.

Foundational Framework

The preliminary inquiry of Imseis’ study is what happens when the UN’s actions or omissions do not conform with international law, considering its status as the global guardian of international order? Imseis chooses Palestine as a case study to investigate such an inquiry for two reasons: the Palestinian cause is almost as old as the Organization and presents an opportunity to examine its action over its entire existence. Second, no available independent and critical scholarly study brings together the international legal literature on the Palestinian cause and the UN experience in dealing with it. Imseis adopts in his analysis the subaltern theoretical approach associated with the Third World Approach to International Law school of thought. He considers the European imperial foundation of international law established to regulate the colonial Other and calls this rule by law.[1] Imseis aims to demonstrate its unfolding in the UN’s involvement in Palestine post-WWII, i.e., at a time of universal transition to a rule of law among the international community where all subjects are equal. Imseis clarifies that the study keeps at its forefront the lived reality of the indigenous people of Palestine as “colonized, dispossessed, forcibly exiled, occupied, discriminated against” who have had a “sustained history, presence, and agency of [their] own” and capable of representing themselves. In these terms, the study interrogates how the position of Palestine in the global system was legally compromised.[2]

Imseis aims to demonstrate its unfolding in the UN’s involvement in Palestine post-WWII, i.e., at a time of universal transition to a rule of law among the international community

Imseis creates a dichotomy between a rule of law versus a rule by law, claiming the latter to be imperial practices codified in regulation to control and preserve power. Whereas Imseis is presenting the rule of law as prevailing international law that calls for equality which the UN failed to apply to the question of Palestine, resulting in an ILS state. One cannot but be curious to identify the source of Imseis’ rule of law and whether adherence to its requirements would have actually brought about a different result for Palestine. Considering Imseis’ Third World Approach to International Law analysis, couldn’t it be argued that the European colonial powers that imposed a rule by law, are the same parties that established the UN entity and drafted its rule of law. Thus, their interests would necessarily be built into the system. In other words, the rule of law and the rule by law may have practically had the exact origins, with the former merely being more amenable in presentation and subtle neo-implementation. The rule of law created in the initial years post-WWII mainly was based on customary principles that Europe developed to govern its expansion and exploitation, away from the right to political liberation or self-determination of those governed. Therefore, one wonders whether a rule of law application would have prevented the production or continuation of Palestine’s ILS condition, especially when comparing Palestine to other Third World countries’ status in the post-decolonization era, which Imseis discusses in chapter four of his book.

The Origins of Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity

Imseis does not claim that the UN established the ILS condition. Rather the treatment of Palestine under the prevailing Eurocentric international legal order in the interwar period between 1915 and 1947, created such disenfranchisement. Imseis argues that the institutionalization of Palestine’s ILS was first found in the Mandate system of the League of Nations. The Mandate, with its civilization trusteeship, which codified the “hegemonic/subaltern” dichotomy into law, was an instrument of “internationalization”[3] of the subordinate legal status of the colonies at the global level, consequently producing ILS.[4] Imseis adds that Zionism’s structural reliance on European imperialism is relevant to understanding the evolution of Palestine’s ILS. Herzl propagated Zionism as a colonial idea, considering it a la mission civilisatrice. Yet the aim was to create a Jewish nation in Palestine “secured by public law” by adopting legal discourses of civilizing an already inhabited non-European land. The British Mandate for Palestine operated an international rule by law by legally privileging the Zionists’ Jewish national home project over the previously assured political rights of the indigenous majority.[5]

Here, Imseis indeed dives with great depth into the implications of the Zionist settler-colonial project on the Palestinian subordinate legal status. It could be argued, however, that the implementation of the Mandate system, even if without the condition of establishing a Jewish home, would have posed Palestine in a similar ILS state. And instead, the existence of the Zionist project had placed Palestine and its people, unlike other Mandated colonies, under an additional existential threat of systematic elimination. The European rule by law facilitated the implementation of such elimination, i.e., the Europeans needed to produce the ILS condition first in order to make the Zionist mission possible. Moreover, the maintenance of the Zionist colonial regime to our current day necessitated the recurrent reproduction and perpetuation of the ILS, as Imseis clarifies. Nevertheless, Imseis seems to have avoided a discussion of the Zionist constructed racist hierarchies and their magnitudes in creating a superior/inferior dichotomy between Jews and Palestinians that justified the latter’s elimination. It would have been interesting to measure the consequences of such internal subordination setting on Imseis’ presented subordinate legal status.

Resolution 181(II): The United Nations Continues the International Rule by Law

Once instituted in 1945, the UN inherited the British objectification of Palestine’s ILS condition in its management of the cause, thereby considered a site of continued rule by law. Imseis argues that this first became evident in its 1947 General Assembly resolution 181 (II) which proposed the partition (two-state framework) against the wishes of the indigenous majority, prioritizing European interests over the international rule of law as then applied to Palestine. The partition would not be legal without the freely expressed consent of the governed. This is read in light that the Mandate promise of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine had already been fulfilled [emphasis on the promise of a home, not a state]. Efforts to request an ICJ[6] advisory opinion on the General Assembly’s entitlement to provide a recommendation without the people’s consent, i.e., to provide resolution 181 (II), were defeated in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question[7] (Committee). Indeed, the Cuban delegate then joined the Colombian and Iraqi objections and noted that refusal to seek an ICJ opinion “was a mistake” and “may well give the impression that the Assembly is avoiding solutions which conform to the law.”[8]

The Committee circumvented the indigenous Palestinian population’s empirical reality and democratic right to determine the fate of the whole territory and created “two racially gerrymandered states”

The deliberation records that led to resolution 181 (II) passage reveal three factors that reflect the international rule by law in its making. First, there was bias[9] in the Committee’s composition of European and settler-colonial bloc majority (no Arabs). As noted by John Quigley, the Committee was “friendly territory for the Jewish Agency from the cultural standpoint.”[10] Second, there was no sufficient engagement of Palestinian Arab opinions in the debates. At the time of deliberation, the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine (AHC) boycotted the Committee; nevertheless, the Committee was too unwilling to encourage or facilitate engagement and instead treated the boycott with a blaming-the-victim approach appropriating the consequences on the subaltern. Thus, the Committee’s fact-finding mission lacked the objectivity or fairness to hear both sides.[11] Third, the Committee circumvented the indigenous Palestinian population’s empirical reality and democratic right to determine the fate of the whole territory and created “two racially gerrymandered states,” which violated the Mandate system and the UN Charter, continuing the imperial Eurocentric international order and ILS condition in the UN system.[12]

What makes matters worse is that the UN knew about the military outbreaks between Arabs, Jews, and the British at the time and the relative military capabilities of both sides. It was not oblivious to the possibility of violence occurring following the partition. This suggests the UN’s unwillingness to account for the force that may be directed against the unprotected Arab civilian population, which may alter “the demographic and political status quo of the country.” Imseis calls this a “cognitive dissonance” on the part of the UN.[13]

Imseis revisits resolution 181(II) in his 2021 article ‘The United Nations Plan of Partition for Palestine Revisited: On the Origins of Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity.’[14] He there further illustrates the selective approach toward legal application and abuse in legislating the two-state framework as a cornerstone of the UN’s legal stance on Palestine. Imseis’ unraveling of the 1947 events leading to resolution 181(II) reaffirms the concern about the cited rule of law. Imseis refers to the articles of the Mandate system as the law that the Committee had violated in its recommendation, when Imseis had initially criticized the Mandate as a rule by law, motivated by European imperial interests. It could be argued that such a validating reference would offer legitimacy to the Mandate system that had created the ILS condition in the first place.

Imseis consideration of the UN function to revolve around tangible equity excludes the criticism of the UN being merely a shrouding machine set to subtly maintain the Western dominance and thus interests

Also, his presentation of the internal verbatim and records of the Committee reflects a continuation of the “hegemonic/subaltern” dichotomy inherent in the rule by law, whether in the negligence of non-Western voices calling for an impartial interference or ignorance of Palestinian discontent with the partisan recommendation. The preservation of such dichotomy is also apparent in Imseis later citations of the UN’s internal debates on Palestine. This leads one to question whether the UN working mechanism, with a structure that allows such dichotomy, actually reflects a rule of law. Imseis’ stance throughout the arguments seems to have had a lenient treatment of the UN that may further entrench what is known as the ‘Palestinian exception.’ His consideration of the UN function to revolve around tangible equity excludes the criticism of the UN being merely a shrouding machine set to subtly maintain the Western dominance and thus interests. Consequently, such consideration implies that the UN’s approach towards Palestine may have been an exception to what otherwise has usually been good governance. But when one perceives the inherent structures undergirding such power dynamics within the UN, one questions the system as a whole. Indeed, what law order would accept an illegal act to become a legal basis for future actions? At the beginning of his book, Imseis declares that Palestine is a case study to examine the UN’s status as the global guardian of international order. But Imseis’ seems to have restrained his focus to presenting the UN’s approach towards Palestine’s ILS condition and evaded a broader examination of or conclusion on the UN’s status as a universal protector and whether there is a need for a radical refinement of the system.

The Decolonization Era and the Occupied Palestinian Territories as an Embodiment of Third World Subalternity

The multi-wins of the Third World states in the decolonization era gave rise to a gradual recognition by the UN of Palestinian legal subjectivity and rights, including the right to self-determination in the OPT[15] as part of the two-state framework. Nevertheless, Imseis explains that certain structural inequalities that hindered the full independence of Third World politics, culture, and economy remained in place. The Third World quasi-sovereignty rendered them unequal to the UN’s Western counterparts and thus preserved their ILS condition as subaltern members.[16]This solidifies the proposition that the imposition of an ILS condition upon Palestine and its people would have still taken place even without a Zionist project. Palestine would have been in a situation similar to the struggle of other Third World countries in pursuit of equal sovereignty. The only difference is the Zionist elimination mission which transformed the discussion on historical Palestine into a discussion on OPT and Israel.

The UN actions on the question of Palestine in the post-1967 era reveal the preservation of the ILS through a rule by law dynamic. Despite apparent mitigation of Palestine’s ILS condition through the UN’s increased recognition of Palestinian rights following decolonization, the status has been substantially maintained, but in a different form. Imseis explains that the UN’s failure by omission to apply the full normative rule of law in its treatment of the OPT and the disenfranchised Palestinian people upheld the ILS condition. The UN failed to clearly identify the illegality of the Israeli prolonged military occupation of the OPT, with all the ramifications such illegality entails under international law, including ending it unconditionally. Rather, it sufficed to take a humanitarian-based approach of documenting Israel’s IHL and IHRL violations. Moreover, the UN furthered dependency on unbalanced bilateral negotiations with a proven bad faith and more powerful occupant that leaves no room for Palestinians to exercise sovereignty. The UN’s lack of a principled position resulted in a nominal and contingent recognition of Palestinian rights, where rights are affirmed only to a point and implementation is left to a “legitimate Israeli hegemony,” practically making their realization impossible.[17]

Imseis presents UN practice in six cases[18] of alien occupation, where the UN position was contrary to its approach towards the Israeli occupation. Imseis illustrates that the international rule of law does not allow for negotiation to end the Israeli occupation; rather, it should be brought to an unconditional end based on the law of state responsibility. Imseis explains that the rule by law in such a situation affirms the ILS condition of the weaker occupied population and added political legitimacy to the occupier, keeping the enfeebled population captive. Imseis then continues to inquire whether the UN has an open door to correct its position and alleviate Palestine’s ILS condition. Imseis then provides precedents where counter-hegemonic recourse to international law had offered the subaltern some relief, precisely the case of Namibia.[19]

Imseis goes to great length in his 2020 article “Negotiating the Illegal: On the United Nations and the Illegal Occupation of Palestine, 1967–2020,”[20]detailing the illegality of the Israeli 53-year occupation of the OPT, explaining the systematic violation of three jus cogens norms: the prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of force, the obligation to respect the self-determination of peoples, and the obligation to refrain from imposing alien regimes inimical to humankind, including of racial discrimination. Imseis clarifies in his 2021 EJIL[21] blog “Of Straw Men, the United Nations and Illegal Occupation: A Rejoinder to David Hughes”[22]that occupation does not represent an illegal state of affairs that requires an immediate termination. Rather, the “legality of an occupation as measured through the systematic violation of these norms triggers specific obligations under the law of state responsibility to end occupation forthwith and unconditionally.”

Legality of an occupation as measured through the systematic violation of these norms triggers specific obligations under the law of state responsibility to end occupation forthwith and unconditionally

The decolonization era brought about changes in the UN’s perpetuation of the ILS condition on Palestine. Imseis claims it took the form of an omission to execute the prevailing international law. While this is true, one could also argue that the UN upheld the ILS status through a violation of rule of law in addition to the omission. The Organization failed to identify the illegality of the Israeli occupation and failed to call for its unconditional termination but also violated international law by taking a negotiation approach when the law does not allow it. But what is actually special about the decolonization era is the new composition of the General Assembly, and Imseis draws attention to the efforts of Third World actors in steering the UN’s approach. Nevertheless, there is a curiosity to explore the influence of transnational social movements, basically ordinary people, on the UN institutional dynamics during this period. An evaluation of the role of such movements and their alliance at that time as the driving force behind the General Assembly would have been appreciated. On the other hand, an argument could be made regarding the blind belief of such movements at that time in an emancipatory power of the UN or the misplaced confidence in its discourse. Here, there are many lessons to be learned that could help populations, particularly Palestinians, eschew repetitive UN disenfranchisement and perhaps direct the compass towards revolutionizing its structures.

Membership in the United Nations and Perpetuation of the International Legal Subalternity

Imseis claims the UN’s failure to admit Palestine to full membership under Article 4(1)[23] of the Charter manifests the perpetuation of Palestine’s ILS condition. Imseis explains that the UN’s prior practices of a liberal, flexible interpretation were abandoned under US pressure on several members of the Committee on Admission to an unduly narrow and erroneous interpretation towards Palestine. The Committee issued its report stating it “was unable to make a unanimous recommendation” on Palestine’s admission, i.e., a de facto rejection. Each member of the Security Council is represented on the Committee. Considering the permanent seat of the great powers on the Security Council, decisions on new admissions to the UN are kept under their hegemonic interests and thus arbitrary use. The malicious exercise of the neo-imperial authority to make such decisions under a “legitimizing cloak of the UN Charter” is the essence of imposing the ILS condition upon the disenfranchised.[24]

Indeed, some members of the Committee on Admission imposed conditions in the assessment irrelevant to Article 4(1), including consideration of the “broader political context” and the reaffirmation of “a negotiated settlement” to be the “only option for a long-term sustainable peace.” The Committee’s conclusion seems to confirm with the US representative statement in the Council debate on the matter: “we believe that Palestinian efforts to seek Member State status at the United Nations will not advance the peace process, but rather will complicate, delay and perhaps derail prospects for a negotiated settlement. Therefore, we have consistently opposed such unilateral initiatives.” Nevertheless, the US supported Israel’s admission to membership in 1949 without the requirement of concluding peace agreements with its neighboring states and even presented extraneous factors to argue the case for admission. Palestine presented arguments that the application for membership does not contradict the political peace process and is not an alternative to negotiation to no avail. The Lebanese ambassador articulated in the debate that otherwise, “Palestinian statehood would be made dependent on the approval of Israel, which would grant the occupying Power a right of veto over the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people.” In this case, the exercise of the Council’s power, mainly the US here, to cause Palestine’s failure to obtain admission embodies the persistence of the ILS condition in the system.[25]

Imseis illustrates the longstanding UN practice in assessing Article 4(1) statehood criteria through the four Montevideo: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states,” and clarifies the double standard treatment taken to assess Palestine’s request compared to Israel’s admission process in 1948 under Article 4(1).The double standard treatment is evident in the Committee’s assessment of the “defined territory” requirement despite the UN recognizing the OPT borders as the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital. However, Israel’s application for membership during the 1948 war, where the original designated Jewish territory under resolution 181 (II), was accepted despite ongoing expansions through military operations. The US then spoke at the Council in answer to states’ rejections: “[o]ne does not find in the general classic treatment of this subject any insistence that the territory of a State must be exactly fixed by definite frontiers.”[26]

The third disagreement among Committee members was whether Palestine fulfilled the requirement of an effective and independent governmental control test, considering the 2007 split between Fatah and Hamas and the latter controlling 40% of the population. Imseis claims that such measures on the part of the UN go against its longstanding practices. Imseis invokes the case of Congo’s admission in 1960 when its central government was divided between two factions, yet the UN still approved its membership. Finally, the Committee differed on the fourth requirement questioning whether the Palestinian Authority has the capacity to conduct forging relations in light of the Oslo Accords restriction. Yet, this hesitation does not correlate with the UN’s practice regarding Ukraine, Monaco, the Marshal Islands, and many other states, where the state’s foreign relations were not wholly or partially ceded to another state. Furthermore, Palestine has been conducting foreign relations ever since 1988 at the UN and with Israel, and, indeed, over 130 states recognize Palestine as an independent sovereign. The approach towards Israel’s application had been entirely different with regards to this requirement; The US then argued a liberal approach stating: “we already have, among the Members of the United Nations, some political entities which do not possess full sovereign freedom to form their own international policy.”[27]

Imseis concludes that the double standard in applying UN principles and international rules demonstrates the hegemonic-subaltern binary use of the law through the exercise of neo-imperial authority and thus perpetuating the ILS condition of Palestine and its people.[28]Imseis moves to explore the effect of the Third World dominated General Assembly resolution 7/19 on 29 November 2012 on Palestine’s ILS condition. Imseis sees the Palestinian pursuit of an upgraded status of a non-member observer state came as an attempt to utilize counter-hegemonic tools to mitigate the ILS condition. Nevertheless, the new status limits Palestine’s engagement in the UN to “Palestinians and Middle East issues.” It cannot vote or submit its own candidacy for elections or appointment. Thus, this upgrade demonstrated “both the promise and the limits of international law for subaltern peoples.”Palestine’s inability to become a member state due to the malicious exercise of neo-imperial power maintains it in a permanent condition of contingency, and thus ILS status.[29]

Palestine’s inability to become a member state due to the malicious exercise of neo-imperial power maintains it in a permanent condition of contingency, and thus ILS status

It seems as if Imseis is proposing a third form of upholding the ILS condition: the arbitrary exercise of power in decision-making processes within the UN. Imseis’ demonstration of Palestine’s journey toward UN membership appears to confirm one’s assumption of an inherent rule by law in the function of the Organization in its current structure. It is the most explicit historical moment of those examined in his book that echoes the lack of an authentic rule of law. This is not meant in the sense that the UN deviated from an existing rule of law; instead, to point out that the prevailing international law cited by Imseis is and has always actually been a rule by law shielded via an umbrella of institutional legitimacy.

What is Next for Palestine and its People?

Imseis concludes his presentation, stating the long-range structural deformity in the UN’s management of the question of Palestine and the resulting condition causing Palestine and its people much suffering. Imseis concludes that the counter-hegemonic struggle continues with the subaltern belief in a virtuous global order. Yet he seems to doubt whether Palestine’s attempt to break free from the ILS condition via tactical counter-hegemonic means will succeed. The Palestinian efforts throughout the various global periodic shifts present an example of the “politics, scope and limits of contemporary international law and organization.” The question of Palestine remains “a litmus test” for the international system’s validity as a whole.[30]

Indeed, there is wonder about the available tools for Palestinians to achieve free and equal sovereignty in such a system. Imseis lays in his book the foundation for much-needed literature that incorporates a critical legal analysis, particularly the Third World Approach to International Law, toward the question of Palestine. He rightfully scorns the gullible fantasy of a just world where righteousness would prevail over Western interest. The reorientation towards counter-hegemonic measures offers a glimpse of hope when proceeded with a great understanding of the underlying prejudice within the international system. Imseis’ exposure of the UN’s reinforcement of Palestinian subordination directs advocates and scholars alike to urge immediate reform in the UN’s characterization of the Palestinian cause and approach toward its solution. Perhaps the way forward could be a path of revolutionization instead of blind utilization.

Keywords: United Nations Palestine Subalternity Thesis Keywords: United Nations Palestine Subalternity Thesis

* Dalaal F. Jaber is a researcher at Law for Palestine, international law lawyer and activist.She holds an LLM from the U.S. and an LLB from Palestine. Jaber works as a Policy and Advocacy Associate in Washington, D.C., and is now pursuing a Juris Doctor. Jaber is interested in critical legal theory, social movements, and rebellious lawyering.

** Ardi Imseis is Assistant Professor of Law at Queen’s University, was most recently a Member of the UN commission of inquiry on the war in Yemen (2019-2021). Between 2002 and 2014, he served in senior legal and policy capacities with UNRWA in Palestine. He has provided expert testimony in his personal capacity before the UN Security Council on multiple occasions. Imseis is author of the United Nations and the Question of Palestine: Rule by Law and the Structure of international Legal Subalternity (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), and his scholarship has appeared in a wide variety of international journals. Imseis is former Editor-in-Chief of the Palestine Yearbook of International Law (Brill; 2008-2019), and Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar and Human Rights Fellow, Columbia Law School. He holds a Ph.D. (Cambridge), LL.M. (Columbia), LL.B. (Dalhousie), and B.A. (Hons.) (Toronto).

Footnotes

[1] Imseis wrote (P.6): “A critical reading of the history of international law and institutions reveals that the mechanisms, doctrines and technologies created as a means of achieving a liberal rights based global order have at times shown themselves to be the very tools through which that order has been frustrated or undermined to the detriment of subaltern classes.”

[2]ArdiImseis, The United Nations and the Question of Palestine: A Study in International Legal Subalternity, University of Cambridge(2019), Pages 1-7, https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.37976.

[3] Imseis quoted Pedersen (P.27): “the process by which certain political issues and functions are displaced from the national or imperial, and into the international, realm.”

[4]Id. Pages 25-28.

[5]Id. Pages 29-42.

[6] The International Court of Justice.

[7] Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question was later named the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).

[8]Id. Pages 44-63.

[9] The Soviet delegate, similar to the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Uruguay representatives, stated “[i]t would be unjust not to consider this and deny the Jewish people’s right to realize this aspiration. It would be unjustifiable to deny this right to the Jewish people, particularly given all it has undergone during the Second World War. Consequently, the study of this aspect of the problem and the preparation of relevant proposals must constitute an important task of the special committee.” Yemen expressed to the General Assembly: “If Jews were persecuted in Europe what have the people of Palestine to do with that?” Yet the articulated Arab concerns were to no avail.

[10]Id. Pages 65-71.

[11]Id. Pages 71-76.

[12]Id. Pages 65-86.

[13]Id. Pages 86-98.

[14]ArdiImseis, The United Nations Plan of Partition for Palestine Revisited: On the Origins of Palestine’s International Legal Subalternity, 57 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1 (2021), Pages 1-54, https://law.stanford.edu/publications/the-united-nations-plan-of-partition-for-palestine-revisited-on-the-origins-of-palestines-international-legal-subalternity/.

[15] The Occupied Palestinian Territories.

[16]Imseis, A Study in International Legal Subalternity, supra note 1, Pages 99-105.

[17]Id. Pages 105-117, and 151-155.

[18]Imseis presents UN practices in other alien occupations, particularly in six cases Namibia, Afghanistan, and Kuwait, where the UN declared the occupations as illegal, and Western Sahara, Norther Cyprus, and East Timor, where the UN remained silent on the occupations’ legality. Imseis highlights the correlation between the UN deeming an occupation illegal and the occupations coming to an unconditional end versus the latter three cases where the end of the occupation depended on negotiation. The UN’s action in the first three was consistent with international law whereas its position in the latter three was a rule by law contrary to the law on state responsibility.

[19]Id. Pages 120-150.

[20]ArdiImseis, Negotiating the Illegal: On the United Nations and the Illegal Occupation of Palestine, 1967–2020, 31 European J. of Int’l Law 3 (2020), Pages 1055–1085, https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chaa055.

[21] European Journal of International Law.

[22]ArdiImseis, Of Straw Men, the United Nations and Illegal Occupation: A Rejoinder to David Hughes, Blog of the European J. of Int’l Law, Feb. 18, 2021, https://www.ejiltalk.org/of-straw-men-the-united-nations-and-illegal-occupation-a-rejoinder-to-david-hughes/(last visited Apr. 13, 2022).

[23] Imseis enumerated Article 4’s criteria to acquire membership subsequent to the UN’s founding as follows:“(1) Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; (2) the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

[24]Imseis, A Study in International Legal Subalternity, supra note 1, Pages 156-169.

[25]Id. Pages 169-175.

[26]Id. Pages 175-179.

[27]Id. Pages 179-184.

[28]Id. Pages 185-193.

[29]Id. Pages 193-196.

[30]Id. Pages 201-209.

Learn more about Palestine’s path at the UN: watch this webinar recording, in which we hosted the three UN Special Rapporteurs on Palestine: John Dugard, Richard Falk and Michael Lynk, along with Ardi Amseis